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ABSTRACT
This paper represents the results of an examination of the implementation
of India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). This project included
purposive sampling as well as interviews with resolution professionals, representatives of India's Insolvency ProfessionalAgencies, and officials of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India.
Analysis of this data identified three problems:
1. Vesting near-plenary control of the Corporate Resolution
Insolvency Process (CIRP) with a Committee of Creditors
made up of financial creditors has led to a perception of inequitable distributions between the classes of creditors.
2. The CIRP provisions of the IBC are inconsistent with
public policy to the extent that they were construed to fail to
protect vested charges of secured creditors.
3. The CIRP provisions and the accompanying Insolvency
Resolution Regulations fall short of the standards of procedural fairness.
To resolve these problems this paper suggests that the Insolvency Resolution Regulations be revised to: (i) define "net liquidation value" as the value of
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the assets of the corporatedebtor less the value of those assets subject to secured
claims of holders of registered charges; (ii) require any resolutionplan to account
for the value of the secured claims of holders of registered charges in assets of the
corporate debtor; (iii) require any resolution plan to disclose information substantiating the allocation of value within the class of financial creditors and
between the classes of financial and operational creditors; and (iv) require the
Committee of Creditors to provide reasons for any deviation from the norm of
equitable distribution of any residual enterprise value between the classes of
financial and operational creditors.
In Part I of what follows there is a brief introduction to salient features of
the corporate insolvency resolution process under the IBC. Part II describes the
research underlying this project while Part III elaborates on certain aspects of
that research. Part IV situates the conclusions of that research in the larger
framework of Indian law and internationalpractices. Finally, Part V lays out
proposed changes to the CIRP Regulations and a defense of their efficacy in this
context.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY
RESOLUTION PROCESS OF INDIA'S INSOLVENCY AND
BANKRUPTCY CODE
What follows is a short survey of a few of the important features of the
CIRP. More comprehensive introductions to the IBC can be found
elsewhere.1
A.

THE INSOLVENCY APPLICATION: ADMISSION AND CONSEQUENCES

The IBC is composed of five Parts. Part I contains only three sections
the most important of which is section 3, Definitions. Part II deals with corporate debt resolution and liquidation in three chapters. Chapter 1 of Part II
includes definitions applicable only in Part II, Chapter 2 provides the law for
the CIRP, and Chapter 3 addresses corporate liquidations. Chapter 2-the
CIRP provisions-is bare-boned although some of its gaps are filled by crossreference to the liquidation provisions in Chapter 3.2 Part II also includes
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 which provide for a fast track CIRP, voluntary corpo1
E.g., Dhanjay Kumar, The New CorporateInsolvency Regime in India: A ParadigmShift, Amer. Bankr.
Inst. J. 38 (April 2019); Adam Feibelman, Legal Shock or False Start? The UncertainFuture of India'sNew
Personal Insolvency and Bankruptcy Regime, Tulane Public Law Research Paper, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract.id=3092042; Shikha Rawal, The Evolutionary Landscape of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in India-Analysis and Key Observations (November 2017), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract -id=3079292; Nimrit Kang & Nitin Nayar, The Evolution2of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in India, ICRA Bulletin: Money and Finance, 37 (2003).
See, e.g., Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 25(2)(j), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in, (authorizing the resolution professional to pursue avoidance actions described in Chapter
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rate liquidation, an adjudicating authority, and a list of related criminal offenses. The CIRP Regulations supplement the law for corporate insolvency
process. Together the CIRP and the CIRP Regulations provide the struc3
ture of the insolvency resolution process for corporations in India.
A CIRP begins with an application. An insolvency application may be
filed by a financial creditor, 4 an operational creditor,5 or the corporate
debtor 6 itself but only on the occurrence of default 7 -the triggering event.8
The requirement of a default distinguishes a CIRP both from a voluntary
Chapter 11 bankruptcy under the US Bankruptcy Code, which requires
nothing more than a petition for reliefY and from an involuntary Chapter 11,
which is conditioned on insolvency of the debtor. 10 IBC section 11 describes
the few circumstances in which an insolvency application cannot be filed.1 1
A two-member panel of the adjudicating authority-the National Companies
Law Tribunal (NCLT)-determines whether to admit an insolvency application. 12 The application becomes a proceeding when admitted. Admission
sets the insolvency commencement date that in turn starts the clock for various deadlines in the CIRP.
3

The panoply of regulations includes the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) (Insolvency
Resolution Process for Corporate Persons), Regulations, 2016 ("CIRP Regulation"); IBBI (Liquidation
Process), Regulations, 2016 ("Liquidation Regulations"); and Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to
Adjudicatory Authority), Rules, 2016 ("AA Rules").
4Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, §§ 5(8), 7, INDIA COD (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
5Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, §§ 5(20), 9, INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
6Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, §§ 3(8), 10, INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
7
1nsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 6, INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in.
'Compare this with 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (2019) (triggering admission of an involuntary petition is
not paying "debts as such debts become due"). Chapter 11 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) is the
United States Bankruptcy Code.
911 U.S.C. § 301.
'011 U.S.C. § 303(h).
"Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 11, INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in.
The following persons shall not be entitled to make an application to initiate corporate insolvency resolution process under this Chapter, namely:
(a) a corporate debtor undergoing a corporate insolvency resolution process; or
(b) a corporate debtor having completed corporate insolvency resolution process
twelve months preceding the date of making of the application; or
(c) a corporate debtor or a financial creditor who has violated any of the terms
of resolution plan which was approved twelve months before the date of making of an application under this Chapter; or
(d) a corporate debtor in respect of whom a liquidation order has been made.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, a corporate debtor includes a
corporate applicant in respect of such corporate debtor.
2
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, §§ 7(4), 9(5), 10(4), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
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The CIRP explicitly provides expressly for only two classes of creditors,
financial and operational. The definition of financial debt (and hence, financial creditor) is broad" 3 but can be described generally as banks and other
professional lenders. Most financial creditors will be secured. 14 In turn, operational creditors can be characterized generally as suppliers of goods and
services. Omitted from this two-fold division, at least on the face of the text,
are other sorts of creditors such as lessors of immovable property, licensors of
intellectual property, governments with respect to tax dues, holders of claims
sounding in tort, and others. What to do with these "others" has been addressed piecemeal by amendment 15 and judicial construction 16 but gaps
remain.
With the order admitting the application, the NCLT declares a moratorium,1 7 issues a public announcement of the proceeding along with a call for8
the submission of claims, and appoints an interim resolution professional.1
The CIRP thereafter may proceed with relatively little involvement by the
NCLT.

B.

THE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONAL: MANAGING THE DEBTOR AND
THE PROCESS

The NCLT must appoint the interim resolution professional within fourteen days of admission although it usually happens more quickly.' 9 Management and control of the corporate debtor passes to the interim resolution
professional. 20 The interim resolution professional has a number specific statutory duties 2 1 and one overriding goal: to make "every endeavour to protect
and preserve the value of the property of the corporate debtor and manage
13

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 5(8), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
14Compare Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 21(2), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in with 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (creditors' committee made up only of unsecured creditors).
15
E.g., The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 (adding real estate allottees to list of examples of financial creditors).
6
E.g., Pr. Dir. Gen'l of Inc. Tax v. Synergies Dooray Automotive Ltd. (NCLAT New Delhi 2019),
available at https://nclat.nic.in/Useradmin/upload/17597993375c92le2d89odf.pdf (determining that
dues owed to government are operational debts).

17Compare Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 14(1), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (staying a procedure automatically).
l1nsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 13(1), INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in. The substance of each of these steps is elaborated in subsequent sections of the IBC.
9Ilnsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 16(1), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
2
1Compare Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 17, INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (determining the rights, powers, duties, and authority of
debtor-in-possession).
2
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 18, INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in.
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the operations of the corporate debtor as a going concern." 22
Among the most important duties of the interim resolution professional is
to constitute a formal committee of creditors (CoC).2 3 All financial creditors

of the debtor constitute the CoC. In one of its first acts the CoC must
appoint a permanent resolution professional. The CoC may appoint the existing interim resolution professional or choose a replacement. 24
The resolution professional has far-reaching powers and is comparable to
a Chapter 11 trustee under US bankruptcy law. 25 The resolution professional is entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the entire CIRP as
well as operating the business of the debtor.2 6 The resolution professional
must preserve and protect the assets of the corporate debtor, raise any necessary interim financing, appoint any needed professionals, maintain a list of
claims, and file avoidance actions.2 7 In addition to continuing the business
operations of the debtor, the resolution professional has three duties crucial
to the resolution process: prepare an information memorandum, solicit resolution applicants, and present all qualifying resolution plans to the CoC. 28 The
resolution plan is the centerpiece of the CIRP.
C. THE RESOLUTION PLAN: THE GOAL
9
The resolution professional is required to invite expression of interest 2
from eligible 30 potential resolution applicants who may wish to submit reso22

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, §

20(1), INDIA CODE (2016), http://

indiacode.nic.in.
23

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, §

21(1), INDIA CODE (2016), http://

indiacode.nic.in.
2

4Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 22(2), INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in. In addition to selecting a resolution professional, the CoC has the unfettered power to
replace one resolution professional with another. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 27,
INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in. See infra Part III-A.
25
See 11 U.S.C. § 1106.
26
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 23, INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in.
27
1nsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 25, INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in.
2
Id. See also Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 29, INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in (containing the information memorandum). The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India
(Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2018, Gazette of
India, pt. III sec. 4 (July 4, 2018), §§ 36, 36A, and 36B, at 30-33, available at http://egazette.nic.in/
(S(qxwohkcrzgchoanufmumlglg))/Searchl.aspx (addressing details of the information memorandum, inviting expressions of interest, and requesting resolution plans).
29
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2018, Gazette of India, pt. III sec. 4 (July 4, 2018), § 36A, at 30,
available at http://egazette.nic.in/(S(qxwohkcrzgchoanufmumlglg))/Searchl.aspx.
3
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 29A, INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in. Section 29A amended the original IBC in two stages to render ever-larger numbers of
persons ineligible to submit a resolution plan. For a lengthy discussion of the scope and significance of this
section, see the judgment of the Supreme Court in ArcelorMittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar
Gupta, (India) (October 4, 2018), available at https://ibbi.gov.in//webadmin/pdf/order/2018/Oct/
33945_2018_Judgement04,Oct,2018_2018-10-04%2015:36:20.pdf. For United States law on the same
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lution plans. As part of the process of inviting plans, the resolution professional must supply potential resolution applicants with a detailed information
memorandum and an evaluation matrix. 31 The CoC is to use the evaluation
matrix to identify the best resolution plan. 32 An eligible resolution applicant
then prepares and submits a resolution plan to the resolution professional.
IBC section 30(2) contains six mandatory elements for a resolution33plan. Additional requirements are found in CIRP Regulations 37 and 38.
The resolution professional conducts an initial review of each plan to
verify that it addresses each of the mandatory elements and that the resolution applicant is eligible. The resolution professional then submits each qualifying plan to the CoC to be reviewed according to the evaluation matrix. An
affirmative vote by members of the CoC holding at least 66% of the claims of
the financial creditors is required to approve a plan. 34 The resolution professional next submits the plan approved by the CoC to the NCLT panel for
final approval. 35 Formally at least, the scope of review by the adjudicating
authority is quite limited; it may examine the plan only to verify that it is
consistent with the mandates of IBC section 30(2).36 Finally, if approved by
issue see 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (giving debtor-in-possession exclusive power for 120 days to file plan of reorganization unless otherwise ordered by the court).
31
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2018, Gazette of India, pt. III sec. 4 (July 4, 2018), § 36B(1),
availableat http://egazette.nic.in/(S(qxwohkcrzgchoanufmumlglg))/Search1.aspx. An example of an evaluation matrix is available at Model Evaluation Matrix, Insolvency Professional Agency of The Institute of
Cost Accountants of India, http://www.ipaicmai.in/IPANEW/UploadFiles/Other/
MODELEVALUATIONMATRIX.pdf. Compare this with 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (containing the disclosure statement).
3
See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate
Persons), 2016 (Amended up to July 4, 2018) Regulations, 2018, (July 4, 2018), § 39(3), available at
https://upload.indiacode.nic.in/showfile?actid=ACCEN_2 11_00055_2016311517807328273&type
=regulation&filename=pdf of__cirp regulations 2018-04.07.2018_amended-all_2018-07-06_16_
22_34.pdf ("The committee shall evaluate the resolution plans ... strictly as per the evaluation matrix to
").
identify the best resolution plan ....
33
Compare this with the United States' requirements in 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (containing plan of
reorganization).
34
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 30(4), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
3
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 31(1), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacode.nic.in.
36
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 31(2), INDiA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic
.in. See also Binani Indus. Ltd. v. Bank of Baroda (In the Matter of Binani Industries Limited) (NCLAT
New Delhi 2018), available at https://nclat.nic.in/Useradmin/upload/16821674135cO61ffdla478.pdf
("[I]f the opposition to the proposed resolution plan is purely a commercial or business decision, the same,
being non-justiciable, is not open to challenge before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) or for that
matter the Appellate Authority (NCLAT)."). Nonetheless, another NCLT panel subsequently approved a
plan on the condition that the CoC reconsider specified distributions to certain creditors: "we feel appropriate to observe by making suitable suggestions to the CoC that the method for apportionment of the
amount from the Resolution Applicant be relooked into and reconsidered . . . ." Standard Chartered Bank
v. Essar Steel India Ltd. (In the Matter of Essar Steel India Ltd.) (NCLT Ahmedabad 2019) 137, available
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the NCLT the plan "shall be binding on the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the
37
resolution plan."
II. RESEARCH PROGRAM

A.

HYPOTHESIS 1: VESTING NEAR-PLENARY CONTROL OF THE
PROCESS WITH FINANCIAL CREDITORS MAY CAUSE
INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTIONS BETWEEN THE CLASS OF
FINANCIAL CREDITORS AND THE CLASS OF OPERATIONAL
CREDITORS.

CIRP

The CIRP vests control of the process in the hands of a resolution professional who, in turn, answers to the CoC. Voting membership of the CoC is
limited to financial creditors, typically banks that have security interests in
the assets of the corporate debtor. While the Supreme Court has charged the
CoC to treat all creditors equitably, 38 before August 2019 the IBC required
only that operational creditors get at least the liquidation value of the assets
of the debtor. 39 The liquidation valuation is contained in a confidential document available as of right only to the resolution professional and the CoC.
Thus, it is possible that the CoC will approve a resolution plan that allocates
to financial creditors a disproportionate share of the value of the debtor. Regrettably, this hypothesis remains unverifiable given lack of access to the resolution plans as well as the fair-value and liquidation-value valuations of
40
debtors.

at https://nclt.gov.in/sites/default/files/final-orders-pdf/Final%20Essar-compressed_13.pdf.
Compare
this with 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (containing detailed confirmation standards).
37
1nsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 31(1), INDIA CODE (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in. Compare this with United States bankruptcy law in 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (providing broad
conclusive effects of confirmed plan of reorganization)..
3
Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (Supreme Court 2019) at
46 & 47, availableat https:/
/www.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/4653/4653_2018judgement_25-Jan-2019.pdf.
39
Much of the ambiguity surrounding the treatment of secured creditors was resolved by the 2019
Amendments. See infra text accompanying notes 63-74. The 2019 Amendments followed by several
months the survey and interviews on which the empirical observations of this article are based, and
provide substantial resolution to the problem identified in Conclusion 2. Nonetheless, the 2019 Amendments do not affect the problems identified in Conclusions 1 or 3. They may even make them worse.
40
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) (Third Amendment) Regulations, 2018, Gazette of India, pt. III sec. 4 (July 4, 2018), § 35(3), available at http://egazette.nic.in/(S(qxwohkcrzgchoanufmumlglg))/Search1.aspx ("The resolution professional
and registered valuers shall maintain confidentiality of the fair value and the liquidation value.").
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VESTING NEAR-PLENARY CONTROL

PROCESS WITH FINANCIAL CREDITORS HAS LED

TO THE PERCEPTION OF INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTIONS
BETWEEN THE CLASS OF FINANCIAL AND THE CLASS OF
OPERATIONAL CREDITORS.

Alternative Hypothesis 1 was tested through purposive sampling by a
survey directed to insolvency professionals as well as interviews with insolvency professionals. Selected portions of the survey are included as Appendix
1. The survey and interviews identified additional matters that we have also
analyzed.
C.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Alternative Hypothesis 1 was verified.
In addition, the results of the survey and interviews support the following conclusions:
2. The CIRP provisions of the IBC are inconsistent with
public policy because they have been construed to fail to
protect vested charges that secured creditors have against
the property assets of the corporate debtor.
3. The CIRP provisions and CIRP Regulations fall short
of the standards of procedural fairness.
III. SUMMARY OF SELECTED SURVEY RESPONSES
A. ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS 1: VESTING NEAR-PLENARY CONTROL
OF THE CIRP PROCESS WITH FINANCIAL CREDITORS HAS LED
TO THE PERCEPTION OF INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTIONS
BETWEEN THE CLASS OF FINANCIAL AND THE CLASS OF
OPERATIONAL CREDITORS.

It is noteworthy that 67% of respondents expressed agreement with the
following Survey Question:
15. Committees of Creditors are seeking a speedy return for
financial creditors and are failing to maximize distributions
to all creditors.
Another 11.1% strongly agreed while equal percentages (11.1%) disagreed and strongly disagreed. While the sample size is small, Alternative
Hypothesis 1 is warranted. Interviews with resolution professionals (RPs)
and other insolvency professionals confirmed the results of the survey.
An even more uniform set of responses characterized the next Survey
Question:

DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
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16. The unilateral power of Committees of Creditors to replace resolution professionals leads RPs to act for the interests of financial creditors over the interests of operational
creditors.
Two-thirds of respondents agreed and another 22% strongly agreed. The
remainder (11.1%) neither agreed nor disagreed. In other words, there was a
strong consensus that even disinterested resolution professionals may experience a bias in favor of the controlling class of financial creditors. Taken together, the responses to survey questions 15 and 16 indicate there is a
significant perception of a problem with the "creditor-in-control" model embodied in the CIRP.
B.

OTHER SALIENT FINDINGS

1. Concerns about the CoC
The responses to the survey do not, however, suggest a solution to the
perception of CoC unfairness. Survey Question 6 asked respondents to rank
their three leading concerns about the IBC among ten listed. "Membership of
Committees of Creditors (generally only financial creditors)" received a low
weighted score. 4 1 This suggests that whatever solution for inequality of
treatment might be proposed, the respondents did not believe adding operational creditors to the CoC would be helpful. This is the case even though
"Indecisiveness of Creditors" tied for second among concerns, which suggests
that the respondents do not have a high regard for the representatives of the
financial creditors who currently make up CoC's.
The concern of the respondents about the work of CoC's can also be seen
in their responses to Survey Question 17: "Financial creditors are failing to
approve hiring professionals by resolution professionals and/or failing to fund
the expenses of RPs in an adequate manner." Seventy-seven percent agreed
or strongly agreed while only 11.1% disagreed. The remainder neither agreed
nor disagreed. There is no reason to believe that the addition of operational
41

In descending order of priority, the concerns were:
Concerns

Weighted
Scores

(1) Section 29A; Valuation/Value Destruction; Indecisiveness of CoC (tie)

25

(2) Delays in CIRP Process

24

(3) Strategic (Non)Voting on CoC's; Lack of [Systemic] Infrastructure (tie)
(4) Membership of CoC's (financial creditors only); Sales of Claims by Financial

22
14

Creditors to Promotors (tie)

(5) Sales of Claims by Financial Creditors to Others; Post-confirmation Assessment of
Dues (taxes) (tie)-

12
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creditors to the CoC would change this situation but clearly something is
needed to cause all CoC's to take their responsibilities seriously in all
proceedings.
2. The scope of plan proponents
One of the highest ranked problems identified by the respondents may be
related to total distributional concerns as opposed to the division of value
between financial and operational creditors. The respondents identified "Section 29A" as one of the two the most significant current issues under the
IBC. 4 2 This likely indicates that they believe that the scope of persons
barred from submitting a resolution plan is so large as to reduce competition
which, in turn, depresses the value tendered in resolution plans.
3. A better legal framework system of secured debt
The overwhelming positive response to Survey Question 12 is also instructive. Almost 77% of respondents supporting the following:
In the US (and recently more nations) there is a strong property-rights system of personal property security interests
available to all creditors that include (i) a public registry of
such security interests, catalogued under the name of the
debtor (ii) accessible to the public (including other potential
secured creditors). Do you believe India could implement
such a system?
43
This topic is addressed in more detail later in this paper.
IV. CONTEXTUALIZATION OF CONCLUSIONS
A. VESTING NEAR-PLENARY CONTROL OF THE CIRP

PROCESS WITH

FINANCIAL CREDITORS HAS LED TO THE PERCEPTION OF
INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTIONS BETWEEN THE CLASS OF
FINANCIAL AND THE CLASS OF OPERATIONAL CREDITORS.

It has been said that perceptions of the truth are as important as the
truth itself. The perception that CoC's, dominated by financial creditors, are
treating other creditors inequitably may be an example. If widespread, such a
perception will undermine trust in the CIRP and even the IBC as a whole.
Recent gains in the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business Index" may be
squandered. At least one topic for additional investigation can also be drawn
from the survey: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI)
should make available for independent research purposes all approved resolution plans and their supporting information memorandums (including fair42
See note 30 which discusses a wide range of persons and related entities prohibited from submitting
resolution
plans.
43
See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
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value and liquidation-value valuations). 44 Only by a careful analysis of the
supporting information can the perception of inequity between classes of
creditors be confirmed or discredited. In the interim, the additions to the
CIRP Regulations described in Part V could change this perception for the
better.
B. THE CIRP

PROVISIONS OF THE IBC ARE INCONSISTENT WITH

PUBLIC POLICY TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY HAVE BEEN
CONSTRUED TO FAIL TO PROTECT VESTED CHARGES OF
SECURED CREDITORS.

Issues related to the legal system for secured credit in India must first be
considered from the global perspective on secured credit generally. Only
then will the relationship of secured credit to the legal framework for insolvency be considered.
1. International norms for secured credit
The World Bank's "Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/
Debtor Rights" 45 ("World Bank Principles") begin with the following observation: "[o]ne of the pillars of a modern credit economy is the ability to ...
grant a security interest to credit providers with respect to such interests
and rights as a means of gaining access to credit at more affordable prices." In
other words, secured lending is a key element for an economic system that
relies on credit. In turn, availability of credit (in addition to investment) is
crucial to increasing the range and scope of the supply of goods and
services.

46

Merely the power to grant security interests is not enough to spur credit
and economic development. There must be corresponding legal system that
effectively recognizes, regulates, and enforces security interests. The possessory pledge of collateral as security for a debt has existed from time immemorial. What makes for a modern system of secured credit effective in a creditdriven economy are the principles of abstraction and reification. The notion
of security is first abstracted from the fact of physical possession. Then the
abstract notion of "security interest" is reified as a legal concept, i.e., it be44Existing data on the IBBI website is consistent with these conclusions. For example, as of 31 December 2018, among the five CIRP processes yielding plans before the Delhi Bench of the NCLT, three
reported realizable proceeds for operational creditors of less than the liquidation value while only two
reported greater realizations, available at https://ibbi.gov.in/webadmin/pdf/whatsnew/2019/Feb/Copy
%20of%2OFor%20website-publication-resolution%20data%20Dec-2018%2OAmended-2019-02-22%
2022:54:14.pdf. Compare this with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (mandating public filing of disclosure statement and plan of reorganization).
4"World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/DebtorRights (2015), available at

https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/the-world-bank-principles-for-effective-insolvency-and-creditor-rights.
46Id.
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comes legally enforceable. Legal concepts standing alone, however, are insufficient unless embedded in a working legal system. 47 The combination of a
legal concept and a legal system is what the World Bank calls a legal
framework.48
The World Bank Principles thus provide that an effective legal framework for secured lending "should allow effective notice and registration rules
to be adapted to all types of property, and should provide clear rules of priority
on competing claims or interests in the same assets." The World Bank Principles conclude with the observation that a nation's legal system for insolvency
should work in tandem with its framework for secured lending such that
insolvency "[s]ystems should aspire to: ...(x) recognize existing creditor
rights and respect the priority of claims with a predictable and established
process . . . 49
2. The general legal context for secured credit in India
As matters currently exist in India, no single statute fully addresses creation, public recognition, priority, and enforcement of security interests. The
Securitization Assets Reconstruction and Enforcement of Security Interests
Act ("SARFAESI") addresses enforcement of charges but only by banks or
other financial institutions.5 0 SARFAESI falls short as a comprehensive legal
system for a second reason: Apart from an agreement among secured creditors, it provides no means by which multiple secured creditors of various
47

See Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY LJ. 1193, 1210
(observing that, in the United States Bankruptcy Code, the use of the phrase "interest in property" in
addition to the term "property" is intended to reach abstract, intangible "things" like "a contract, an
account receivable, or a security.").
4
SSee generally Richard A. Posner, Creatinga Legal Frameworkfor Economic Development, 13 WORLD
BANK OBSERVER 1, 1-11 (1998), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/36219146814
8521481/Creating-a-legal-framework-for-economic-development.
49
See World Bank Principles supra note 45. See also UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law, 13 (2005), available at https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/0580722-Ebook.df:
Clear rules for the ranking of priorities of both existing and post-commencement
creditor claims are important to provide predictability to lenders, and to ensure
consistent application of the rules, confidence in the proceedings and that all participants are able to adopt appropriate measures to manage risk. To the greatest extent
possible, those priorities, should be based upon commercial bargains and not reflect
social and political concerns that have the potential to distort the outcome of insolvency. According priority to claims that are not based on commercial bargains
therefore should be minimized. (Emphasis added).
5
°See The Securitisation, Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest
Ordinance ("SARFAESI"), § 2(1) (zd), 2002, (Ministry of Law, Justice, and Co. Affairs, Legislative Dep't),
available at http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2002-54.pdf ("'secured creditor' means any bank
or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks or financial institutions . .. ."). For enforcement of charges by secured creditors that are neither banks nor financial institutions see India Code Civ.
Proc. (1908), § 73 (permitting holders of charges against property subject to execution the power to
enforce its charge against proceeds of the execution sale).
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types can establish priority in moveable collateral. 51 Of course, as a matter of
common law, first charge holders should have priority over subsequent
53
ones. 52 While SARFAESI does not address this issue, another body of law,

the Companies Act, 2013 provides that the statutory means for evidencing
priority is the order of registration.5 4 Thus, in a roundabout way, the nonbankruptcy law of India is substantially consistent with international norms
for secured credit.

3. The legal context for secured credit in insolvency proceedings in
India
As discussed above,55 IBC sections 5(7) and (20) acknowledge two classes of creditors: financial and operational. The importance of that distinction
is most evident in IBC section 24 that provides that only financial creditors
can vote as members of the CoC. Yet, use of these terms in the CIRP, rather
56
than legal expressions like secured and unsecured creditors, led to problems.
"See VINOD KOTHAI, SECURITIZATION ASSETS RECONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS

1057 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2013) (discussing SARFAESI § 13(9)):

This subsection deals with one of the most complex aspects of secured lending:
dealing with multiple security interests.... This law does not deal with the issue of
priorities and apparently treats all secured creditors holding security interests on
the asset at par, which only means that priorities and subordinations shall be as per
mutual agreement, failing which, as per insolvency rules. (Emphasis added).
"E.g., English and Scottish Mercantile Investment Co. Ltd. v. Brunton [1892] 2 QB 700.
"See Nagpur Foundries Limited v. United Commercial Bank II, BC 112 (DRT Nagpur 2005).
54
See The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, § 80, INDIA CODE (2013), http://indiacode.nic.in. ("Where
any charge on any property or assets of a company or any of its undertakings is registered under section
77, any person acquiring such property, assets, undertakings or part thereof or any share or interest therein
shall be deemed to have notice of the charge from the date of such registration."). See also KOTHARI supra
note 50 at 1062 ("The law dealing with priorities in India, for companies not in winding up, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, is the order of registration of charges in the case of companies, and
insolvency rules."). The law regarding priority of charges in immovable property is as follows:
Where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over
the same immoveable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to
their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special
contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created.
Transfer of Property Act, No. 4 of 1882, § 48, INDIA CODE (1882), http://indiacode.nic.in.
"See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
"The division of creditors into two classes has created additional issues outside the scope of this
paper. After payment of the costs of the CIRP, IBC § 30(2) mandates that a resolution plan make payments to financial and operational creditors only. Yet, IBC § 31(1) states that the approved plan binds
.the corporate debtor and its employees, members, creditors, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in
the resolution plan." But what of creditors who are neither financial nor operational? Are they bound by
the resolution plan even though it may make little provision for their payment, or do their claims "ride
through" the CIRP unaffected? The Appellate Tribunal in Pr. Dir. Gen'l of Inc. Tax, supra note 16 dealt
with this question by expanding the definition of operational creditor by holding that "all statutory dues
including 'Income Tax', Value Added Tax' etc. come within the meaning of 'Operational Debt'." Id. 29.
But what of unpaid rent due to landlords? What of claims of holders of rights of intellectual property or
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Except as they are defined in the IBC, the labels "financial" and "operational" carry no legal significance. Rather, each is descriptive of the nature of
the relationship that gave rise to the status of creditor. In other words, they
are accounting terms. Yet, it is only as creditors that a party has standing to
make a legal claim against a debtor. The distinction between secured and
unsecured creditors recognizes a further legal distinction: Both are equal as
creditors yet one, in addition to its claim of debt, has an interest in property
of the debtor. 57 It is this foundational legal distinction that until recently
found uncertain recognition in the CIRP provisions.58 The initial failure of
the CIRP to take a creditor's status as secured into account led the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) to conclude that all financial
creditors-secured and unsecured-must be treated similarly. 59 A year later
in the Essar Steel appeal, the NCLAT went further and held that all financial creditors-secured and unsecured-should be treated alike 6° and then
took the extraordinary step of holding that financial and operational creditors
61
must receive virtually identical treatment.
India's Parliament acted quickly to amend the CIRP provisions, taking
only eight days from the initial Cabinet proposal 62 of the amendment until
licensors of technology? More broadly, why would the IBC define the term "operational creditor" if it
really meant to include all creditors who are not financial creditors?
"TThe Companies Act § 2(16) ("'charge' means an interest or lien created on the property or assets of
a company or any of its undertakings or both as security and includes a mortgage"). See also Nagpur
Foundries, supra note 53.
5
8See IBC §§ 30-31, which are silent on whether there should (or should not) be any disparity of
treatment between secured and unsecured financial creditors. By way of contrast, the status of secured/
unsecured is relevant in the event of liquidation. See IBC § 53(1). A pair of early commentators noted
with concern that the CIRP provisions lacked the explicit protections for rights of secured creditors found
in the United Kingdom's Insolvency Act 1986 § 4(3). Nonetheless, they went on to conclude that the
CIRP "should be read so as to allow a class of creditor full opportunity to contest any disregard of his class
rights." VINoD KOTHARI & SIrHA BAssiAL, LAw RELATING TO INSOLVENCY & BANKRUPTCY CODE
288 (2016).
"See Binani Indus., supra note 36 at 17(3)(eXvi) (-[T]he dues of creditors of 'Operational Creditors'
must get at least similar treatment as compared to the dues of 'Financial Creditors'.") and 23 ('[T]he
'I&B Code' or the Regulations framed by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India do not prescribe
differential treatment between the similarly situated 'Operational Creditors' or the 'Financial Creditors'
on one or other grounds.").
'°Standard Chartered Bank v. Satish Kumar Gupta, Resolution Professional (In re Essar Steel Ltd.)
(NCLAT 2019) at
172 ("[W]e hold that the 'Financial Creditors' cannot be discriminated on the
ground of 'Secured' or 'Unsecured Financial Creditors' for the purpose of distribution of proposed amount
amongst stakeholders in the 'Resolution Plan' by the 'Resolution Applicant'.")
6iId. at
149:
In the present case, we have noticed a huge discrimination made by the 'Committee
of Creditors' in distribution of proposed amount to the 'Operational Creditors' qua
'Financial Creditors'. Majority of the [secured] 'Financial Creditors' have been allowed 99.19% of their claim amount, whereas 'NIL' i.e, 0% in favour of the 'Operational Creditors'. Such distribution is not only discriminatory but also arbitrary.
62
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Bill, 2019, available at https://
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each house of Parliament had passed it.63 The 2019 Amendments firmly
tethered the confirmation standards of IBC section 30 to recognition of the
security interests of financial creditors. The Supreme Court of India upheld
the validity of the 2019 Amendments three months later in the appeal from
64
the NCLAT judgment in Essar Steel.
Following the 2019 Amendments, IBC section 30(2)(b) now provides
that operational creditors shall receive not less than the greater of (i) the
amount they would have received in the event of liquidation under IBC section 53 or (ii) the amount that would have been paid if the consideration paid
under the resolution plan were distributed under the liquidations waterfall of
section 53.65 Further, an acceptable plan need pay dissenting financial credi66
tors no more than the liquidation value of their collateral, if any.
The 2019 Amendments clearly provide that security interests continue
into a CIRP and that holders of charges are entitled to at least the liquidation
value of their collateral. With these changes the CIRP provisions are restored to consistency with international norms. 6 7 In addition, the 2019
Amendments expressly delegate regulatory implementation of IBC section 30
68
to the IBBI.
In the final appeal of Essar Steel the Supreme Court issued a 164-page
www.prsindia.org/sites/default/files/bill files/Insolvency%20and%2oBankruptcyo20Codeo20%28
Amendment %29%20Bil1%2C%202019_0.pdf
63
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Amendment Act, No. 26 of 2019, available at https://
ibbi.gov.in//uploads/legalframwork/630af836c9bbedO47c42dbdfd2aca1 3.pdf.
'Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kuman Gupta (Supreme Court 2019),
available at https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/24417/24417-2019-4-1501-18158judgement15-Nov-2019.pdf
6
'Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 30, INDIA CODE (2016), as amended, http://
indiacode.nic.in:
(2) The resolution professional shall examine each resolution plan received by him
to confirm that such resolution plan(b) provides for the payment of debts of operational creditors in such manner as
may be specified by the Board which shall not be less than(i) the amount to be paid to such creditors in the event of a liquidation of
the corporate debtor under section 53; or
(ii) the amount that would have been paid to such creditors, if the amount
to be distributed under the resolution plan had been distributed in accordance with the order of priority in sub-section (1) of section 53,
whichever is higher ...
66Id.
and provides for the payment of debts of financial creditors, who do not vote in
favour of the resolution plan, in such manner as may be specified by the Board,
which shall not be less than the amount to be paid to such creditors in accordance
with sub-section (1) of section 53 in the event of a liquidation of the corporate
debtor.
67
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
6
See 2019 Amendments, supra note 63:
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opinion in which it reversed the decision of the appellate panel and elaborated on the place of secured credit under the CIRP. 69 Working from the
text of the 2019 Amendments and synthesizing a range of international
materials the Court concluded that
[I]t can be seen that the Code and the Regulations, read as a
whole, together with the observations of expert bodies and
this Court's judgment, all lead to the conclusion that the
equality principle cannot be stretched to treating unequals
equally, as that will destroy the very objective of the Code
.... Equitable treatment is to be accorded to each creditor
depending upon the class to which it belongs: secured or un70
secured, financial or operational.
While resolving one problem, the 2019 Amendments do nothing to recognize a claim of operational creditors to a share of any residual enterprise
value. 7 1 They may even weaken such a claim. Explanation 1, which the 2019
Amendments added to IBC section 30, provides that regardless of the enterprise value, a distribution in accordance with the provisions of IBC section
30(2)(b) shall be deemed "fair and equitable." 72 As used in the cramdown
provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code, "fair and equitable" limits
the priority of secured creditors to the value of their collateral, not the
amount of their claims. 7 3 By contrast, measuring fair and equitable by the
liquidation waterfall of IBC section 53(1) may foreclose distributional complaints by operational creditors but at the expense of diverting additional
value to financial creditors.
Example 1. Assume that OldCo, a corporate debtor valued at $10 million
MEMORANDUM REGARDING DELEGATED LEGISLATION
Clause 6 of the Bill relating to amendment of section 30 of the Gode empowers the
Board to make regulations for specifying the manner of payment of debts.
2. The matters in respect of which the aforementioned regulations may be made are
matters of procedure and administrative detail, and as such, it is not practicable to
provide for them in the proposed Bill itself. The delegation of legislative power is,
therefore, of a normal character.
69
Essar Steel, supra note 64.
70
7

d. at

57.

iIn late December 2019 the Government of India issued a second set of amendments to the IBC in the
form of an ordinance. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019, Gazette of
India, pt. II sec. 1 (Dec. 28, 2019), available at https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/legalframwork/d6bl7lec9b9
ea5c54f7423bc36f92977.pdf (addressing a variety of matters but not the residual claims of operational
creditors).
Legislation to make the ordinance permanent will be enacted.
72
See Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 30(1), INDIA CODE (2016), as amended,
http://indiacode.nic.in:
Explanation 1.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby carried that a distribution
in accordance with the provisions of this clause shall be fair and equitable.
73See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(bX2).
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as a going-concern but only $5 million in liquidation, finds itself in a CIRP.
Assume further that OldCo owes $10 million to FinCred, a financial creditor,
that has a perfected security interest in all of OldCo's assets, and another $5
million to unsecured creditors. Finally, assume that NewCo submits a resolution plan for $10 million. After the 2019 Amendments, FinCred is entitled to
the full $10 million. Had OldCo sought to cram down an equivalent plan
under Chapter 11, FinCred could have received $5 million on account of its
secured claim and $2.5 on its unsecured claim. The general unsecured creditors would share in the remaining $2.5 million.
A resolution plan under amended IBC section 30 will pass muster even
when the total received by financial creditors exceeds the value of all collateral as long as the plan pays the liquidation value of unsecured property to
operational creditors. Since the liquidation provisions of IBC section 53(1)(d)
and (e) place even unsecured financial debts (and deficiencies) owed to secured creditors ahead of operational debts, all financial debts-not merely the
value of collateral securing those debts-may be paid to financial creditors
before any residual value must go to general unsecured creditors.
Example 2. Assume the facts of Example 1 except that FinCred's security interest only attaches to assets with a fair value of $8 million. The liquidation value of all assets remains at $5 million of which $4 million are subject
to FinCred's security interest. A $10 million resolution plan could be approved if it were to pay $9 million to FinCred and only $1 million to general
unsecured creditors
If and when a plan like Example 2 is approved, it may be expected that
such a construction of the 2019 Amendments will find its way to the Supreme Court.74 Adoption of the amendments to the CIRP Regulations described in Part V would avoid this difficulty.
4. The practical context for secured credit in insolvency in India
Data published by the IBBI suggests that many resolution plans may have
accounted for the value of collateral notwithstanding initial judicial uncertainty. In early 2019 the IBBI published a table titled "Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Processes Yielding Resolution Plans: As on 31st December,
74

Or perhaps not. The Supreme Court in its Essar Steel judgment seems to give the CoC virtually
unfettered discretion to share (or not share) with operational creditors any value in excess of the collateral
of financial creditors. See Essar Steel, supra note 64 at 93:

The other argument based upon serious conflict of interest between secured and
unsecured financial creditor ... is an argument which flies in the ace of the majority
of financial creditors being given complete discretion over feasibility and viability of
resolution plans, which includes the manner of distribution of debts [sic] that is
contained in them ....The Committee of Creditors does not act in any fiduciary
capacity to any group of creditors ....
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2018. " 7s The table excerpted in Appendix 2 shows that operational creditors enjoyed cumulative recoveries of over 50% of admitted claims across a
large set of CIRP proceedings. A closer look at the data in the table, however, reveals two significant problems with this encouraging picture.
First, there is virtually no correlation between the reported liquidation
76
value of corporate debtors and amounts realized by operational creditors. It
is certainly not the case that operational creditors are routinely getting more
than liquidation value. Column D in Appendix 2 shows that the average of
liquidation value recovered by operational creditors is 73.39%. By contrast,
the average of liquidation value recovered by financial creditors is 318.30%.
This result is difficult to explain when we recall that IBC section 30(2)(b)
originally mandated that operational creditors get no less than liquidation
value. One explanation for such a lack of correlation could be that resolution
plans were first allocating the value of collateral to financial creditor before
determining the liquidation value available for operational creditors. Alternatively, this discrepancy might be due to some plan proponents seeking CoC
approval for plans by misallocating value away from operational creditors and
to financial creditors. The published data is inadequate to resolve this
question.
Second, if one outlying CIRP 77 is omitted from the data in the table,
operational creditors on average received only 18.01% of the reported liquidation value of the corporate debtor. Here too the published data is inadequate to explain this result.
Ultimately, if India wishes to participate fully in the international capital
markets then it is vital that India's law maintain the extent and priority of
charges existing inside the CIRP in a transparent manner. In this regard, the
additions to the CIRP Regulations suggested in Part V would supplement
the 2019 Amendments.
C.

THE

CIRP

PROVISIONS AND

CIRP

REGULATIONS FALL SHORT OF

THE STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

From the perspective of the process of a CIRP, classifying creditors as
financial and operational serves a practical purpose. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Swiss Ribbons, it makes sense to place financial creditors, who
can be expected to have better and more efficient systems to take decisions in
75See supra note 44.
76The average recovery for financial creditors was 50.45% of admitted claims while the average for

operational creditors was 54.45%. Yet, the standard deviation for recoveries by financial creditors is 33.32
but is an extraordinary 90.54 for operational creditors. See infra Appendix 2 for analysis of date from
table.
77See Appendix 2 Row #74 (ConnectM Technology Solutions Pvt. Ltd.) in which operational creditors realized an astounding 3,200% of the liquidation value of the debtor.

DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

2020)

a CIRP, in ultimate control of the process. 78 Such an allocation of authority
is also consistent with what was hoped to be the time-bound nature of CIRP
matters. Yet, the vital concern with the process of resolving corporate insolvency should not eliminate concern with procedural fairness.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court's judgment in Essar Steel reinforced
the broad power of the CoC:
[The claim of a] serious conflict of interest between secured
and unsecured financial creditors ... is an argument which
flies in the face of the majority of financial creditors being
given complete discretion over feasibility and viability of resolution plans, which includes the manner of distribution of
debts that is contained in them, subject to following the provisions of the Code .... The Committee of Creditors does
not act in any fiduciary capacity to any group of creditors...
• On the contrary, it is to take a business based upon ground
realities by a majority, which then binds all stakeholders ...
79

On the other hand, the Supreme Court recognizes that the IBC constrains the power of a CoC and that it is the responsibility of the NCLT to
ensure those constraints are observed:
[W]hile the Adjudicating Authority cannot interfere on
merits with the commercial decision taken by the Committee of Creditors, the limited judicial review available is to see
that the Committee of Creditors has taken into account the
fact that the corporate debtor needs to keep going as a going
concern ... ; that it needs to maximize the value of its assets;
and that the interests of all stakeholders, including opera80
tional creditors has been taken care of.
Even so, the only remedy when the NCLT believes the CoC has not
considered these policies is to return a resolution plan to the CoC with in7

SSwiss Ribbons, supra note 38 at

28.

28. Most importantly, financial creditors are, from the very beginning, involved
with assessing the viability of the corporate debtor. They can, and therefore do,
engage in restructuring of the loan as well as reorganization of the corporate
debtor's business when there is financial stress, which are things operational creditors do not and cannot do. Thus, preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern, while ensuring maximum recovery for all creditors being the objective of the
Code, financial creditors are clearly different from operational creditors and therefore, there is obviously an intelligible differentia between the two which has a direct relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Code.
79
Essar Steel, supra note 64 at 93.
0
S 1d. at
46.
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structions to do so. Thereafter, "once the [NCLT] is satisfied that the Committee of Creditors has paid attention to these key features, it must then pass
8
the resolution plan, other things being equal."
Instead of the vague policy precautions urged by the Supreme Court, the
regulations should explicitly address aspects of procedural fairness. For example, the ongoing practice of CoC's engaging in negotiations with resolution
applicants must be recognized 8 2 and regulated.8 3 In the American context,
the filing of a Chapter 11 reorganization case has been called "an invitation to
negotiation."8 4 Negotiations take place between classes of creditors outside
the purview of the Bankruptcy Court. Yet, the results of those negotiations
are eventually made public in the process of confirming a plan of reorganization.8 5 In India, however, closed-door negotiations with a resolution applicant by only financial creditors exacerbate the perception of procedural
unfairness. In other words, while the CoC is obliged to choose the best
resolution plan, its process of negotiation and ultimate evaluation is opaque.
It is thus difficult to evaluate the CoC's evaluation of a plan that promises a
greater total return even though it may allocate enterprise value away from
operational creditors and to financial creditors.
Operational creditors have reason to be concerned about the terms of
resolution plans when the only creditor-parties to such negotiations are financial creditors. And as matters currently stand, issues of procedural unfairness
are formally unreviewable by the NCLT.8 6 On the one hand, the time-bound
nature of the CIRP process supports keeping substantive business decisions
of the CoC apart from review. On the other hand, the regulations should
explicitly provide operational creditors and unsuccessful resolution applicants
SlId. The Supreme Court did not elaborate on what it meant by "other things being equal"
82CoC's engage in substantial negotiations with resolution applicants. E.g., Binani Indus. Ltd., supra
note 36 at
13 contains a discussion of such negotiations.
"3Current CIRP Regulations require the resolution professional to circulate an "Evaluation Matrix"
approved by the CoC to prospective resolution applicants. CIRP Regulation 39(3) requires that the CoC
strictly apply the Evaluation Matrix to resolution plans it considers. The IBBI has not yet issued a
regulation mandating the factors and weights to be included in the Evaluation Matrix. In November 2018
the IBBI issued a press release soliciting input on the format of a proposed standard form Evaluation
Matrix (download at https://ibbi.gov.in/webadmin/pdf/press/2018/Nov/PR-Specimen-compressed.pdf).
The proposed standard form accords greater weight to payments to financial creditors than to operational
creditors.
4
In re Arnold, 471 BR. 578, 592 (2012) (quoting [Sen.] Elizabeth Warren & Jay Westbrook, The
Law of Debtors and Creditors 397 (6th ed. 2009)).
85See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1126, 1128 (containing information on, respectively, the disclosure statement, voting by all impaired creditors, and the public confirmation hearing). Chapter 11 of the U.S.C. is
the United States Bankruptcy Code.
S6See Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 31(1), India Code (2016), http://indiacode.nic.in (tying approval by NCLT only to satisfaction of requirements of IBC §§ 30(2), 61(3) (limiting appellate review by the NCLAT to five grounds, none of which encompass procedural unfairness)).

DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

2020)

with power to raise issues of procedural unfairness before the NCLT.87
While the Supreme Court's judgment in Essar Steel preserves a narrowly
circumscribed role for NCLT review, the goal of procedural fairness could be
better accomplished with the additions to the CIRP Regulations described in
the next Part.
V. PROPOSED REGULATORY CHANGES
After considering the three problems this paper has identified, the following additions to the CIRP Regulations are recommended. To restate the
problems, even if the law is now clear that secured creditors have a right to
at least the value of their collateral, distributional inequalities may still be
perceived as evidence of overreaching. Moreover, the opaque process of decision making by the CoC and the unreviewable nature of issues of procedural
fairness exacerbate negative perceptions. There is no way at present to distinguish between a CoC that recognizes the rights of holders of secured
charges and a CoC that is engaging in self-dealing.
No single proposed addition corresponds to a single problem identified in
this paper. Each is interrelated. While not exhaustive, the following regulatory additions nonetheless address these problems.
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY

BOARD OF INDIA (INSOLVENCY
RESOLUTION PROCESS FOR
CORPORATE PERSONS)

[Additional text in italics.]

Defimitions.
2. (1) In these Regulations, unless the context otherwise requires-

(ka) "net liquidation value" means the liquidation value less
the estimated realizable value of the assets of the corporate
debtor subject to a valid, registered and unavoidable charges
liquidated as of the same date;
Explanation: Separately defining "net liquidation value" provides a means
by which the problem identified in Conclusion 2 can be addressed. In addition, the perception of inequitable treatment identified in Conclusion 1
should be reduced if all parties understand that only the net liquidation value
is available for operational creditors.
S7As matters now stand, issues of procedural unfairness are reframed as violations of mandatory norms
and thus receive review. E.g., Binani Indus., supra note 36.

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 94

Mandatory contents of resolution plan.
38. (1) A resolution plan shall identify specific sources of
funds that will be used to pay the(a) insolvency resolution process costs and provide that
the insolvency resolution process costs, to the extent unpaid, will be paid in priority to any other creditor;
(b) net liquidation value due to operational creditors and
provide for such payment in priority to any assenting financial creditor, which shall in any event be made before
the expiry of thirty days after the approval of a resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority;
(c) liquidation value of their collateral due to dissenting
financial creditors and provide that such payment is
made before any recoveries are made by the assenting financial creditors which shall in any event be made before
the expiry of thirty days after the approval of a resolution
plan by the Adjudicating Authority;
(d) current and deferred cash payments to assentingfinancial creditors in an amount the present value of which is
equal to the fair value of their collateral; and
(e) payments to all operational and financial creditors in
an amount equal to any residual value to be paid under the
resolution plan to be shared pari passu on the amounts of
their allowed claims in the following order:
(i) to operational and dissenting financial creditors in
priority to any assentingfinancial creditor, which shall
in any event be made before the expiry of thirty days
after the approval of a resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority; then
(ii) to all assenting financial creditors as provided in
the resolution plan.
Explanation: Only net liquidation value need be paid to operational creditors. Of course, a plan may provide for more. Maintaining positive relationships with suppliers will often be necessary to permit the corporate debtor to
thrive following the CIRP. Operational creditors should understand the appropriate circumstances when they are receiving the lower net liquidation
value of the assets instead of a share of the higher total liquidation value of
the corporate debtor, ameliorating the problem identified in Conclusion 1. In
addition, dissenting financial creditors will be protected from mistreatment
by the voting majority of the CoC. They will receive the liquidation value of
their collateral in advance of any payment to assenting financial creditors.
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Third, assenting financial creditors will receive the fair value of their collateral. Such financial creditors may rightfully receive a premium in the form of
the fair value of their collateral because they are taking a greater risk of nonpayment. Yet, they should receive no more than the fair value of their collateral in their capacity as secured creditors. Finally, all creditors-financial and
operational-should stand to gain to the extent that the resolution plan proposes to pay more than the fair value of collateral and other assets.
Approval of Resolution Plan.
39 ...
(3) The committee shall evaluate the resolution plans received under sub-regulation (1) strictly as per the evaluation
matrix to identify the best resolution plan and may approve
it with such modifications as it deems fit:
Provided that the committee shall record the reasons for approving or rejecting a resolution plan.
Provided further that the committee shall specify the values
under subsection (1) of section 38 and the reasonsfor any deviations therefrom.
(4A) Any creditor or resolution applicant may file with the
Adjudicating Authority an objection to the resolution plan
solely on the ground such plan does not satisfy one or more of
the requirements of the Code and these regulations within
[five] days after the resolution professional submits such plan
to the Adjudicating Authority.
(4B) The Adjudicating Authority shall satisfy itself that the
resolution plan satisfies all the requirements of the Code and
these regulations.
Explanation: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants," wrote US
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis many decades ago.85 Providing additional detail about CoC decisionmaking together with limited but transparent grounds for review will help address the concerns of Conclusion 3 ("The
CIRP provisions and the CIRP Regulations fall short of the standards of
procedural fairness."). Resolution Professionals and CoC's will need to be
more forthcoming about the bases of intra- and inter-class distributions.
Moreover, disgruntled creditors and plan proponents will no longer need to
reframe procedural issues as substantive ones to gain review by an adjudicating authority.
Some might question the efficacy of regulatory solutions to the problems
"SL.

BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY

62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933).
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identified in this paper. After all, is it not the responsibility of Parliament to
address such matters? Three responses can be made. First, the IBC itself
delegates to the IBBI the power to "make regulations and guidelines on matters relating to insolvency and bankruptcy as may be required under this
Code . . . ."9 The 2019 Amendments reinforce this delegation of authority. 90
Without objection, many of the existing regulations have taken vague statutory provisions and rendered them clearer by specification. There is no reason why regulations cannot address the timing of payment between assenting
and dissenting financial creditors, the extent to which any excess value of the
corporate debtor should be allocated among all creditors, as well as clarification of the distinction between commercial and reviewable quasi-judicial decisions of the CoC. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Swiss Ribbons cited a
number of decisions of the United States Supreme Court that support deferring to Parliament in matters of economic legislation. 9 ' The Supreme Court
could turn to the same resource when it comes to deference to the institutional expertise of regulatory bodies. Already in 1984, the United States
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 9 2 held that courts generally should defer to decisions of an administrative
agency. The late Justice Antonin Scalia described Chevron as holding that
great deference must be given to the decisions of [an] administrative agency
applying the statute to the facts and that such decisions can be reversed only
if without rational basis." 9 3 In other words, courts should uphold agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes so long as the interpretation is reasonable. There is ample flexibility in the CIRP to permit the IBBI latitude to
issue reasonable regulations like those suggested here.
Second, while Parliament has rectified the failure of the NCLAT to recognize the legitimacy of secured charges in the CIRP, 94 the precise manner in
which such charges should be handled in the future is a matter to which
regulation is well-suited.
CONCLUSION
The great fiscal, banking, and business successes associated with the implementation of the IBC are a credit to its drafters, the IBBI, the adjudicating
authorities, the judiciary, and India's insolvency professionals. Issues of sub"gInsolvency and Bankruptcy Code, No. 31 of 2016, § 196(1)(t), INDIA CODE (2016), http://
indiacodenic.in.
9OSee supra note 68.
91

See Swiss Ribbons, supra note 38 at 7 (citing New State Ice Co.v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932)
and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1962)).
92467 U.S. 837 (1984).
93
Antonin
94

Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DuKE LJ. 511, 513.
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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stance and administration at the outset of a comprehensive new code were to
have been expected. On the other hand, the problems identified in this paper
are significant. Fears of abuse of power by CoC's strike at the heart of administration of the CIRP. Uncertainty about the extent and standard of
review of decisions by CoC's render the legitimacy of the resolution process
uncertain. All of these problems go to the core of India's need now and in the
future for stable private finance for commercial ventures. All of them strike
at the solvency and stability of India's banking system.
Nonetheless, identification of these problems should be taken as occasions
for further improvements. It is hoped that the insights of this paper and its
proposed revisions to the CIRP Regulations will provide a platform on which
such improvements can be built.
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